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1.  Definition of the problem     
  With the globalization of our society we are increasingly engaged in transactions, 
both online and offline, with people we do not know. This has created a need for 
technologies based on reliability that allow individual identification and authentication 
in a way that cannot easily be abused. Physical or behavioral properties inherent to an 
individual are commonly referred to as biometrics [4]. Biometric systems have found 
their way to a wide range of application domains such as forensics, immigration and 
border control, or physical and logical access control [10]. Passwords compared to 
biometrics is that the second field is considered to be more secure and reliable but 
have an increased awareness of the privacy issues that come with their use. This 
discrepancy between security demands and privacy awareness has given rise to the 
field of biometric template protection [25]. Hide biometric data, prevent linking of 
hidden data and maintain the ability to authenticate or identify a person is some of the 
objectives of this project. The application will be focused on an improved version of 
travel documents embedding electronic chips called electronic passports (ePassports) 
[8]. 
 
Since August 2006 the Member States of the European Union have been required to 
issue electronic passports that contain a digital facial image, and since June 2009 they 
have been obliged to issue second generation of documents that also include two 
fingerprints [12]. The purpose of mandating issuance of ePassports has been to 
strengthen the link between the passport and the carrier of it, as well as to make it 
easier to verify the authenticity of the passport. With the increase in the numbers of 
ePassports in circulation the need arises to assess the security impact of the new 
technology. The Automated Border Control (ABC) systems are already in operation in 
several airports and the added functionality of these passports is being put to use for 
travel facilitation of European citizens [26]. 
 
The estimation of the relevant state-of-art possesses an important role at the phases 
of the research. Starting point seems to be the fingerprint recognition, with widespread 
use in passports, given the fact that fingerprints constitute the most famous biometric 
characteristics. One step further, our research will also rely on template protection 
schemes for Iris code representation [25,31,32,37]. Emphasis will be also given to 
crypto-biometrics in multiple modalities suitable for identity verification, trying to 
improve the available mechanisms and implemented the solutions for large scale 
deployment in order to meet the requirements for such an important performance as 
the electronic passports [10,21]. 
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2.  Strategic objective    
  The main objective of researcher’s work is to demonstrate privacy enhanced 
solutions for the open problems related to ePassport life cycle. Specifically, the main 
goals are: 
 
 
 Analyze crypto-biometrics in multiple modalities. Where we will indicate why 
biometric template protection is not a trivial task. Define the desired properties 
of a good template protection method relevant to fingerprint management and 
the requirements for electronic passport issuance. 
 Strengthen privacy, designing protocols. In this way we will achieve the 
existence of private information queries based on crypto-biometrics. 
 Assess the protection properties. The researcher will use a package of specific 
attacks for the proposed methods. 
 Analyze the results and learn why they are effective. Generalize and provide 
frameworks to support the evaluation of the methods. 

 
  The approached solutions under this Ph.D. research will be used as a useful 
contribution to scientific projects such as those with main field the biometric identities 
investigating identity check for traveler privacy [4,12,18]. These works focus on 
providing trustworthy solutions for travel documents issuing processes, proposing 
algorithms and protocols for passports and suggesting technically-viable proposals 
that are acceptable within the ethical and legal contexts of the larger European Union. 
In this way, this project can improve ePassport security and usability, investigating 
processes and dealing with biometrics and their management in data bases. During 
this doctoral research should also be estimated the solutions from the view of the 
explorations into the operational, social, policy, and legal regulatory issues relating to 
identity, security, and privacy [8,13,26]. 
 
3.  Description   
  In this chapter we will describe the planned activities and the basic motivation of their 
execution. Also, at the chapters below, we will analyze the methodology 
[4,18,22,23,28,29,32] in which these experiments and activities will lead to the goals 
that should be realized for a secure development of technical solutions and 
recommendations to overcome problems in the life cycle of an electronic passport. 
 
The science of establishing the identity of an individual considering the physical, 
chemical or behavioral attributes of the person is defined as biometrics. These 
attributes or physical characteristics that we use to recognize individuals are referred 
to as modalities. The properties that are typically required from a modality, in order to 
be useful in an application such as the implementation of it in electronic passports, are 
universality, uniqueness, permanence, measurability, performance, spoofability and 
acceptability.[8,10,13,26] The figure 1 shows an example of the modalities and their 
data representations that will be useful for this work. 
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Figure 1: Fingerprint and Iris Code Representations 
 
 
3.1  Biometric identity for safe travel document issuance    
  Because of higher technical security of ePassports, the importance of secure 
issuance procedures is increasing in the combat against identity fraud. The issuance 
of electronic passports is performed under coordination and control of a national 
government. Although travel documents can be issued to non-nationals of a country, 
the ePassport is usually only issued to country nationals. Although the technical 
specification of the ePassport is harmonized for the EU Member States, the issuance 
procedure and entitlement criteria for an electronic passport is regulated at a national 
level only and not in the remit of European Council decision, regulating the technical 
security of passports within Europe [12,19,22]. 
 
  An ePassport for a false identity is a valuable tool for fraudsters [13]. Therefore, there 
are constant attacks on the issuance process. In order to estimate the importance of a 
safe travel document issuance, we should consider the threat scenarios which are 
listed below: 
 
 Applying for an electronic passport under a false identity with genuine evidence, 
improperly obtained from another individual. 
 Applying for a passport under a false identity, using manufactured evidence. 
 Using a falsely declared lost or stolen electronic passport of someone who 
resembles the bearer. 
 Apply for an ePassport with the intention of selling it to someone who resembles the 
bearer. 
 Rely on staff to issue an electronic passport outside the regular procedure. 
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  Using biometric systems, gaining knowledge from the existing systems and 
implemented cryptography in order to create a new generation electronic passport 
seems to be a promising technology [2,11,25,31]. In this way, using biometric data for 
purposes of authentication and identification requires agreement on rules regarding, 
what biometric data sets count as acceptable means of identification and how these 
data sets shall be collected, and under which circumstances travel documents that 
contain or reference these data sets shall be issued.  
 
  These agreements and rules belong to the types of conventions that will be 
mentioned at the end of the third chapter. They are conventions about when a person 
counts as self-identical in the eyes of legal authorities [20]. Both kinds of rules present 
particular challenges. In the first case, the challenge is to find data sets which are 
convenient to use for everyday purposes and yet difficult to steal and copy [2]. This 
challenge is, mostly of a technical nature. In the second case, the challenge is of a 
different kind. In the literature on biometric passports, this challenge has become 
known as the problem of “breeder documents” (cf. European Commission 2005: 42-
43). [8] Breeder documents are the documents which are required to apply for a 
biometric passport, e.g., birth certificates. No matter how far we can increase the 
safety and reliability of the process of reading the biometric data from a passport, the 
passport itself will only be as safe and reliable as the bureaucratic process through 
which it was issued [12]. 
 
  Implementing international standards for biometric travel documents, standards which 
are currently being discussed and developed, requires agreement on the issuance 
conditions of such documents [13]. From the perspective of states whose legal 
requirements for the issuance of passport and other international travel documents are 
relatively demanding, universally enforced, and based on reliable breeder documents, 
a call for high international standards in breeder documents will seem like a 
reasonable demand for border security. Also, considering the problem of breeder 
documents from the perspective of a citizen of a state that does not have a trustworthy 
bureaucracy in this regard. If state does not keep proper records of its citizens, or if its 
passport does no fulfill the latest technical requirements imposed by the most 
advanced states, or if its passport issuance process is not transparent enough, this 
citizen will effectively be excluded from international travel to a number of states and 
international travel will generally be very difficult. 
 
Beyond the current issues of privacy and security of the citizens, EU, the U.S. and 
few other states agree on using biometric data and highly reliable breeder documents 
as the precondition for largely unrestricted freedom of movement between themselves, 
recognizing the meaningful sense of the words biometric identification or 
authentication practices [36]. 
 
 
3.2  Biometric template protection 
 
Regarding the fact that ePassports contain biometric data that must be captured and 
then recognized and matched then we can talk about the main objective of biometric 
template protection, which is to protect a piece of iris code or fingerprint data that has 
to be used as a reference for comparison with another very similar but always different 
piece of data [23,28,29,31]. 
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  During this task, the confidentiality of the data should be protected in order to prevent 
impersonation and leakage of sensitive information. (Irreversibility property) This works 
in the same way as we are able to use a password when we can read it, we can use a 
biometric template to construct a new artificial sample that might pass a verification 
test. Secondly, during the process, it should be possible to compare unprotected data 
with protected data.  
 
  It is well known that, in case we want to protect a biometric template we cannot apply 
traditional data protection techniques for passwords applying a one-way function f, 
which is a cryptographic hash function or iterated variant, to a password p that is 
stored in a system during enrollment [31]. Finally, it should be possible to generate 
multiple protected references from the same characteristic. Usually called as the 
diversification property of template protection. Recall that biometric data are 
considered to be unique and in order to be used as identifiers for profiling, two 
protected references should not be comparable. This is often called unlinkability or 
indistinguishability property of protected templates. 
 
In the literature [4,9,14,16,29,34,37], the template protection schemes divided into 
two main categories, reflecting the relevant process and again, separated to those that 
are based on feature transformation and the others are biometric cryptosystems. 
During the specific Ph.D. project for biometrics implemented in passports, the 
researcher will focus on techniques for error correction in order to cover the 
requirements for the design or the estimation of a good template protection scheme. 
As the figure 2 below shows, the error correction techniques are used as a substitute 
for the comparison algorithm where two templates are considered to match based on 
the result of the decoding algorithm. The feature transform techniques are further 
divided into salting methods and non-invertible transformations. The difference 
between the two is that salting applies a transformation that is non-invertible under the 
condition that some parameters or a key are kept secret, whereas the other category is 
a one-way function that is also parameterized or key-dependent, but is considered to 
be hard to invert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Categorization of template protection schemes 
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 The techniques based on feature transformation are generally referred to as 
algorithms for cancelable biometrics. Other names of techniques as synonyms for 
biometric template protection are biometric encryption, untraceable biometrics, secure 
sketch, fuzzy extractor, helper data scheme, pseudo-identities, fuzzy commitment, 
fuzzy vault, shielding functions and random projection. The names of the biometric 
cryptosystem algorithms reflect the original purpose for which these algorithms have 
been designed. Their primary goal is to enable encryption using biometric data directly 
as a key or the extraction of a secret key that could be used in other cryptographic 
algorithms. These techniques, also, protect sensitive data and allow verification by 
verifying that the key extracted from a new sample matches the key that was 
registered during enrollment [31]. 
 
3.3  Crypto-biometrics in multiple modalities 
 
  During the project, the doctoral researcher will design crypto-biometrics 
techniques to the specific case of multiple modalities, suitable for identity 
verification and investigate the adaptation of these techniques for electronic 
passports and other applications. The research will be focused on the generation of 
a key from multiple modalities using the combination of fusing minutiae with iris 
feature and it will be based on cryptographic techniques [1]. 
 
Multi-biometric systems have improved the accuracy and reliability of biometric 
systems and one step further, the issue of recognition is operated on large scale 
datasets. For this reason, it is thought to be the missing key for the improvement of 
the new generation of ePassports. Combining technologies such as fusion, 
template protection for biometrics, we can provide a provable security and privacy 
and attain better rates for the process of recognition, that until nowadays remain 
elusive [4,18]. 
 
When we are taking about crypto-biometrics in multiple modalities, the issue of 
generating and sharing biometrics based on secure cryptographic keys should be 
addressed. In particular, the current literature proposes protocols which integrate 
multi-biometrics, in which information from different sources is combined [8,20,29]. 
These protocols allow generation and sharing of multi-biometrics based crypto-
biometric session keys. Specifically, the mutual authentication matter approached 
with a lack of an extra involvement. The templates are revocable and thus protect 
user privacy [32]. The most distinctive feature of such a protocol is that it can 
integrate multi-biometrics and depending on the required security level, the choice 
of the biometric modalities to use can be made at runtime. This idea seems to be 
extremely important for the electronic passports, considering their process of use 
and the allegation of many different services between the countries [13,26]. 
 
  One of the most important open problems for the research in the area of multi-
biometric template protection is the production of a system like the figure 3 where 
there is the capability of the incorporation of many different biometric templates.
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Figure 3: Proposed multi-biometric template protection system 
 
 
Other challenges for future doctoral work constitutes the template alignment, the 
combination of modalities, the feature representation and the security, privacy issues 
of the system. During the third year of this doctoral research should be addressed the 
possible solutions, in order to evaluate the scalability of biometric schemes and 
estimated the security of any multi-biometric scheme with attention to irreversibility and 
unlinkability issues [1,17,19,31,32,33,37]. 
 
 
 
4.  Usability, convenience, rights and obligations 
 
 
  In order to consummate the research must assure trustworthy results, including 
obligations and responsibilities, while enhancing the privacy of personal data. The final 
stage of this PhD project includes the study of the explorations into the operational, 
social, policy, legal regulatory issues relating to identity, security, and privacy that must 
be addressed by the solutions for the use of biometric data and agree with the current 
proposals for reform of privacy and data protection, published by the EU Commission 
on January of 2012. The researcher must understand some concepts and the 
importance of determining the main principles of data protection. This is a necessary 
condition in order to enhance trust in the use and processing of personal biometric 
data, for research security purposes [8]. 
 
As the passport constitutes a proof of identity, many frauds began to emerge. 
Consequently, an effort has been made all over the years to counter forgeries and 
counterfeits, which has allowed creating the ePassport, a secure passport containing 
biometric information. However, the current system is not perfect and some security 
issues have been found. The whole process can also be very long, especially on 
identity checkpoints where the speed is the main concern, as the people flow is really 
important, heterogenic and complex, which does not help to maintain a certain level of 
security and improve the usability of the ePassport [10]. 
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During the creation process of the ePassport we should safeguard the integrity of 
biometric data in the chips. Many secure processes have been defined, and some of 
those involve the use of certificates.[16] Those certificates are specific to each country 
and every control check point needs to get those certificates in order to manipulate all 
the generated ePassports.[26] These kinds of constraints increase the complexity and 
create a gap in the security. Finally, the passport is used in different environments 
such as airports, frontier or maritime zone, and those areas do not have the same 
usability constraints. To sum up, we should also mention that the passport holder is 
not used to the manipulation of this document and consequently, some constraints are 
related to him. 
 
Furthermore, the most important requirements for usability and convenience which 
must be noticed during this forth-year project are listed in categories such as functional 
related to usability, biometric related to usability, security, speed, standard compliance 
requirements, stability, hardware, data mining performance and more, but their 
analysis in depth is not a field that concerns the KUL researcher of the relevant 
project. 
 
The analysis of requirements gives some recommendations and proposes some 
solutions to achieve those terms. Data mining mechanisms are useful for increasing 
the security and speed of the identity check process. Also, the identity check terminal 
is a complex integrated system composed of several hardware and software 
components that can be used in many different configurations, many usability 
requirements are necessary to have a usable system. Moreover it involves different 
kinds of users with slightly different priorities. For each specific use case, a subset of 
requirements can be defined but there are always common main requirements for first 
the speed of the check process and then the guidance process, the low error rate and 
the low false reject rate [33,34,36]. 
 
The determination of the applicable national data protection law is the starting point 
for every assessment, including a legal review, of data processing activities in which 
personal data, including biometric data, are used. The deal has to do with personal 
data, controllers, processors of the data on behalf of the controller and the processing. 
Data processing principles include the legitimate processing which requires a legal 
basis, the purpose specification and finality principles, the relevancy, adequacy and 
proportionality principles, the prior checking relevant to situations, the security and 
confidentiality, the prohibition of automated decisions and the rights to receive, access, 
correct or object information and finally the transborder data flows. Finally, the 
notification obligation should also be reviewed and additional privacy obligations 
should be imposed, as a matter of importance in research activities for electronic 
passports and the implementation of crypto-biometric systems on them. 
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5.  Applicabilities 
 
 
  The results of this Ph.D. project could be used as a significant contribution to the 
FIDELITY initiative with an overall objective to demonstrate solutions for fast and 
secure real-time authentication of individuals at border crossings [8]. Crypto-biometric 
systems in the electronic passport life cycle will provide a more solid and attractive 
scientific basis for the improvement of the current systems. An important issue that 
concerns ministries and industrial markets from around the world. The doctoral 
researcher of the KU Leuven, consequently, will have the ability to promote the results 
of this work on an international level. Such a significant cause that will bring together a 
wealth of experience and knowledge in matters of security, identification 
documentation and issuance, as well as the technology linked to it. 
 
  As the demands for implemented digital identity technologies are increased, the 
project comes to provide a new proposal for the operation and the use of the future 
electronic passports standards, satisfying the privacy requirements of many 
government sectors and companies dealing with biometric security and privacy 
products.  
 
  Specifically, beyond the relevant educational institutions such as Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Universities in Italy, Germany, Sweden, this technology has 
tremendous advantages in the social and legal fields of human life and the interest of 
all the partners that are involved in this project such as Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) 
which is the central agency for Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry of Security and 
Justice Netherlands, Ministère de l'Intérieur (France), Italian Ministry of Interior, 
Swedish Ministry of Defence and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
shows the importance of this technology that covers diverse factors of identity 
management but also various economical, safety, security, efficiency and regularity 
issues. 
 
  Furthermore, Thales Computer and Network Security that has recently become the 
French market leader in civil biometric systems signing a new contract with France’s 
national agency. Thales is one of Europe’s leading players in the security market 
producing secure identity documents and operational control systems in over 25 
countries. The company's experience in key technologies like sensors, networks and 
secure information systems, positions it as a world-class integrator of complex 
systems and value-added services. Techspace Aero and Belgacom Communications 
are also interested in the development of electronic passports. Other companies are 
Fraunhofer and Bundesdruckerei (Germany), Biometrika in Italy, Selex ES in United 
Kingdom  and more as parts of Safran Aerospace-Defence Security an international 
company which is the world leader in multibiometric identification technologies and a 
major player in explosive detection systems and smart cards, developing products and 
systems. Company’s businesses include criminal identification, border control, secure 
biometric access, payments, digital identity management, telecommunications, travel 
documents, defense and high-value infrastructures, circulation of goods and people,  
public events and emergency services. 
 
 
11 
 
References 
 
[1]  C. Roberts, “Biometric attack vectors and defences”, Computers and Security, vol. 
26, no. 1, pp. 14–25, 2007.  
 
[2] Bruce Schneier. Architecture of privacy. IEEE Security and Privacy, 2009.  
 
[3] H. Gilbert, M. J. Robshaw, and Y. Seurin. HB#: Increasing the Security and 
Efficiency of HB+. In N. P. Smart, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 4965 of LNCS, 
pages 361–378. Springer, 2008.  
 
[4] A. Ross, K. Nandakumar, and A. K. Jain, Handbook of Multibiometrics, Springer, 
Berlin, Germany, 2006.  
 
[5] N. Ratha, S. Chikkerur, J. Connell and R.M.Bolle IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. 
Mach.Intell. “Generating cancelable fingerprinttemplates” ,vol. 29, no. 4, pp.561 -
572, 2007.  
 
[6] O.Billet, J.Etrog, and H.Gilbert. Lightweight Privacy Preserving Authentication for 
RFID Using a Stream Cipher. In S. Hong and T. Iwata, editors, International 
Workshop-FSE,volume 6147 of LNCS, pages 55–74. Springer, 2010.  
 
[7] Frank Breitinger and Harald Baier. Performance Issues about Context-Triggered 
Piecewise Hashing. In 3rd ICST Conference on Digital Forensics & Cyber Crime 
(ICDF2C) , volume 3, October 2011.  
 
[8] EU-FP7 project. Trusted Revocable Biometric Identities.  
 
[9] T.van Deursen and S. Radomirovic. Insider Attacks and Privacy of RFID Protocols. 
In S. Petkova-Nikova, A. Pashalidis, and G. Pernul, editors,EUROPKI, volume 
7163 of LNCS, Springer, 2011.  
 
[10] Dennis Kügler. Security mechanisms of the biometrically enhanced (eu) 
passport. Presentation at the Security in Pervasive Computing conference, 
Boppard, Germany, April 2005.  
 
[11] Juels, A., Wattenberg, M. A fuzzy Commitment Scheme. In Proceedings of the 
6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Singapore, 1–
4 November 1999.  
 
[12] Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine 
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, 
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 21 Feb 2008.  
 
[13] Doc 9303 Machine readable travel documents Part 1 2. Technical report, ICAO, 
2006. Sixth edition.  
 
[14] Biometric System Laboratory - University of Bologna, “FVC2006: the 4th 
international fingerprint verification competition,” 2006.  
 
12 
 
[15] S. T. V. Parthasaradhi, R. Derakhshani, L. A. Hornak, and S. A. C. Schuckers, 
“Time-series detection of perspiration as a liveness test in fingerprint devices,” 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics Part C, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 
335–343, 2005.  
 
[16] Koen Simoens, Julien Bringer, Hervé Chabanne, Stefaan Seys: A Framework for 
Analysing Template Security and Privacy in Biometric Authentication Systems. 
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 7(2): 833-841, 2012.  
 
[17] Vassil Roussev. An evaluation of forensic similarity hashes. Digital Forensic 
Research Workshop, 8:34–41, 2011.  
 
[18]  Bian Yang, Lisa Rajbhandari, Christoph Busch, Xuebing Zhou, Privacy 
Implications of Identity References in Biometrics Databases, 2012 Eighth 
International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal 
Processing (IIH-MSP). 18-20 July 2012. IEEE. pp. 25-30.  
 
[19] Simoens, K., Tuyls, P., Preneel, B. Privacy Weaknesses in Biometric Sketches. In 
Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, 
USA, 17–20 May 2009.  
 
[20] Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne, and David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: 
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions versus Behaviors, Journal of 
Consumer Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 100-126, 2007.  
 
[21] Karel Wouters, Koens Simoens, D. Lathouwers, Bart Preneel. Secure and 
Privacy-Friendly Logging for eGovernment Services. 3rd International Conference 
on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2008), IEEE, 2008.  
 
[22] Simone Fischer-Hübner, John Sören Pettersson, Mike Bergmann, Marit Hansen, 
Siani Pearson,Marco Casassa Mont, HCI Designs for Privacy enhancing Identity 
Management,”Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies and Practices”, Book Editors: 
Alessandro Acquisti, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Stefanos Gritzalis and 
Costas Lambrinoudakis, Auerbach Publications (Taylor and Francis Group), 
2008.  
 
[23]  J. Bringer and V. Despiegel. Binary feature vector fingerprint representation from 
minutiae vicinities. In Proc. of the 4th IEEE Int. Conf. on Biometrics: Theory, 
applications and systems (BTAS’10), pages 1–6, 2010.  
 
[24] J. Feng and J. Zhou "A performance evaluation of fingerprintminutia descriptors", 
Proc. Int. Conf. Hand-BasedBiometrics (ICHB), 2011.  
 
[25] Yang, B.; Busch, C. Dynamic Random Projection for Biometric Template 
Protection. In Proceedings of IEEE 4th International Conference on Biometrics: 
Theory, Applications, and Systems, Washington, DC, USA, 27–29 September 
2010.  
 
[26] Jaap-Henk Hoepman, Engelbert Hubbers, Bart Jacobs, Martijn Oostdijk, and 
Ronny Wichers Schreur. Crossing borders: Security and privacy issues of the 
European ePassport. In Proc. IWSEC 2006: Advances in Information and 
Computer Security, number 4266 in LNCS, pages 152{167. Springer, 2006. 
13 
 
 
 
  
[27] Biometric System Laboratory - University of Bologna,“FVC2006:the 4th  
international fingerprint verification competition” 2006.  
 
[28] A. Ross, J. Shah, and A. K. Jain, “From template to image: reconstructing 
fingerprints from minutiae points,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and 
Machine Intelligence, vol. 29,no. 4, pp. 544–560, 2007.  
 
[29] X. Boyen, “Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors,” in Proceedings of the ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS ’04), pp. 82–
91, Washington, DC,USA, October 2004.  
 
[30] L. Nanni, A. Lumini, M. Ferrara and R. Cappelli, "Learning for combining 
fingerprint matchers: a case study FVC-OnGoing", in Elizabeth T. Mueller, 
Neurocomputing: Learning, Architectures and Modeling, Nova Publishers, 2012.  
 
[31] Christian Rathgeb and Christoph Busch. Multi-Biometric Template Protection: 
Issues and Challenges, New Trends and Developments in Biometrics, Dr. 
Jucheng Yang (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0859-7, 2012. 
 
[32] R. Cappelli, M. Ferrara and D. Maltoni, "Minutia Cylinder-Code: a new 
representation and matching technique for fingerprint recognition", IEEE 
Transactions on Pattern Analysis Machine Intelligence, vol.32, no.12, pp.2128-
2141, December 2010. 
 
[33] M. Ågren, M. Hell, T. Johansson: On Hardware-Oriented Message Authentication 
IET Information Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 329-336, 2012. 
 
[34] Przemysław Błaśkiewicz, Mirosław Kutyłowski “Security and Trust in Sensor 
Networks”. Monographs in Theoretical Computer Science, pp 697-739. An 
EATCS Series 2011.  
 
[35] B. Shanthini, S. Swamynathan “A Secure Authentication System Using 
Multimodal Biometrics for High Security MANETs.” Advances in Computing and 
Information Technology. Communications in Computer and Information Science 
Volume 198, 2011.  
 
[36] Mina Deng, Kim Wuyts, Riccardo Scandariato, Bart Preneel, Wouter Joosen: A 
privacy threat analysis framework: supporting the elicitation and fulfillment of 
privacy requirements. Requir. Eng. 16(1): 3-32, 2011.  
 
[37] D. Maltoni and R. Cappelli, Advances in fingerprint modeling, Image and Vision 
Computing, vol.27, no.3, pp.258-268, February 2009.  
